The situation surrounding the seizure of Nicolás Maduro has not contributed to improving the global security environment; on the contrary, it has made it significantly more unpredictable.
On the one hand, official Washington declares the military operation to have been successful—swift, without casualties among U.S. servicemembers, and with minimal losses on the Venezuelan side.
Formally, these claims correspond to reality. At the same time, the strategic consequences of the fight against drug trafficking from Venezuela proclaimed by President Donald Trump may prove far more complex and less predictable.
The world is gradually moving from a relatively manageable international system to a space of prolonged strategic uncertainty affecting numerous regions and states.
U.S. actions demonstrate the prioritisation of national interests over international law, established diplomatic practices, and existing interstate agreements.
The thesis of the necessity of complete American dominance is presented as non-alternative and, from the White House’s perspective, not subject to debate.
From the Monroe Doctrine to the ‘Donroe Doctrine’
In effect, Washington has begun the accelerated implementation of key provisions of the new U.S. National Security Strategy. For other states of the Western Hemisphere, the notion of an autonomous security space is being virtually nullified.
President Donald Trump is promoting a new concept of international relations that largely relies on a modernised version of the Monroe Doctrine, first articulated in 1823.
In contemporary political discourse, it is increasingly referred to as the “Donroe Doctrine”—an adaptation aligned with current U.S. interests.
The administration is demanding a radical transformation of Venezuela’s policies to account for U.S. interests in developing its oil resources—the largest in the world.
In this context, Venezuelan oil appears to be the key factor, while the fight against drug trafficking plays a largely auxiliary role. At the same time, harsh statements are being made towards Colombia, Mexico, and Cuba, which should hardly be dismissed as mere rhetoric.
Particularly resonant have been public calls regarding the possible establishment of U.S. control over Greenland—a territory belonging to Denmark, a member state of the EU and NATO.
Denmark’s prime minister characterised potential U.S. aggression against Greenland as the effective collapse of the North Atlantic Alliance.
Greenland’s significance is determined not only by its strategic access to the Arctic but also by the presence of some of the world’s largest unexplored mineral reserves, as well as the possibility of controlling vast expanses of the Arctic Ocean.
NATO’s strategic significance is also diminishing, which explains the U.S. intention to reduce or withdraw its troops from Europe
In this situation, countries located outside the Western Hemisphere face a logical question: if the United States openly declares its intention to dominate unilaterally in the western part of the planet, what will its policy towards the Eastern Hemisphere be?
Reliance on the UN, international conventions, and the system of international law is increasingly losing practical relevance. This causes serious concern in Europe and beyond, as similar logic of dominance could be adopted by Russia and China.
In fact, Washington’s behaviour stimulates these states to formulate their own claims to regional or global dominance under conditions of mutual non-interference in the affairs of the Americas.
At the same time, the U.S. National Security Strategy identifies the Pacific and Indian Ocean regions—geographically largely belonging to the Eastern Hemisphere—as the key global priority. This indicates a U.S. desire to exert influence far broader than within a single hemisphere.
By contrast, the Atlantic Ocean, despite its geographical affiliation predominantly with the Western Hemisphere, appears less of a priority for U.S. interests.
In this context, NATO’s strategic significance is also diminishing, which explains the U.S. intention to reduce or withdraw its troops from Europe.
Thus, European states face a choice: either independently develop capabilities to deter potential Russian aggression or risk finding themselves under Moscow’s dominance.
The shift in U.S. policy towards Europe
Within this same context arises the question of possible paths to ending the Russian-Ukrainian war, taking into account Washington’s new priorities and the shift in U.S. policy towards Europe.
Kyiv continues active efforts to conclude a peace agreement to end the war. In the near future, agreement is expected over a joint Ukrainian-European position regarding the basic principles of such a document.
Drafts of security guarantees from European partners have already been developed, as well as their participation in the postwar reconstruction of Ukraine’s devastated economy.
President Donald Trump has publicly promised Ukraine “platinum” security guarantees from the United States, although for Kyiv “iron” guarantees would suffice.
Without ratification, such guarantees risk repeating the fate of the Budapest Memorandum—a document that formally exists but is politically ineffective
However, the absence of clear signals regarding their ratification by the U.S. Congress devalues these promises. Without ratification, such guarantees risk repeating the fate of the Budapest Memorandum—a document that formally exists but is politically ineffective.
Ukraine has appointed a new head of the Presidential Office—a position often informally referred to as vice-presidential.
The post was assumed by the head of military intelligence, Kyrylo Budanov, who maintains established formal and informal contacts with the American side.
This provides grounds for hope for his active participation in the negotiation process and contribution to achieving a just peace settlement. An unjust peace would inevitably become a precondition for a new, potentially even bloodier war.
At the same time, personnel changes are taking place in the leadership of the security agencies, ministries, and regions, indicating President Volodymyr Zelensky’s intention to strengthen the state’s managerial and analytical capacities amid an extremely complex security environment.
Historical experience
Security guarantees for Ukraine from Western partners remain critically important, above all from the United States.
The European “coalition of the willing” demonstrates political will to support Ukraine both now and in the postwar period; however, its military capabilities are objectively limited.
Without reliable guarantees, the peaceful reconstruction of Ukraine’s economy remains in question, as Russia could once again resort to aggression and destroy the results of large-scale investments
Without reliable guarantees, the peaceful reconstruction of Ukraine’s economy remains in question, as Russia could once again resort to aggression and destroy the results of large-scale investments.
Statements by Vladimir Putin about readiness to provide Europeans with written non-aggression guarantees cannot but raise concern.
Ukraine had more than 200 bilateral agreements with Russia guaranteeing its territorial integrity, yet all of them proved declarative. Historical experience confirms the persistence of this practice.
Therefore, such statements should be viewed not as steps towards peace, but as elements of preparation for new conflicts.
Russia’s current actions—particularly the damage to underwater communication cables in the Baltic Sea and radical statements by certain political figures, such as Dmitry Medvedev, regarding the need to abduct the German federal chancellor as was done with the president of Venezuela—only reinforce these concerns.
Against this backdrop, a cautious or ambiguous position by Washington may be perceived by Moscow as a signal for further aggressive actions.
Avoiding such a scenario is possible only if U.S. policy undergoes a fundamental change. However, the initiators of such changes can only be the Americans themselves.
History already knows examples of the division of the world among three empires—particularly in nineteenth-century Europe (1848): the Russian, German, and Austro-Hungarian empires.
The consequences proved fatal not for the initiators, but for subsequent generations seventy years later, in 1918, when all three empires disappeared.
The modern world does not have the luxury of waiting decades to recognise the fallacy of such decisions.
Oleksandr Levchenko, a former Ukrainian diplomat, is a professor at the State University (Kyiv) and a member of the Academy of Geopolitics and Geostrategy (Kyiv).
